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External Balance Correction: 
Depreciation or Protection? 
OVER THE NEXT DECADE the U.S. noninterest  current  account will have 
to shift  from  a deficit  of 3.9 percent  of GNP in 1986  to balance  or even a 
surplus. Is there a need for policy intervention to bring about the 
adjustment?  If so,  which method will maximize welfare: exchange 
depreciation,  tariffs,  quotas, voluntary  export  restraints,  or a mix? 
The first section of this paper sets out a conceptual framework  for 
analyzing  the trade deficit and explains why it must be improved. A 
number  of arguments  suggest that the deficit is no problem. One such 
argument  is that deficits can be financed indefinitely;  another is that 
while surpluses  may  ultimately  be necessary, there  is no need for policy 
intervention.  My own view is that  adjustment  is in  fact required  and  that, 
at the real  exchange  rate  levels of early 1987,  even allowing  for lags, the 
adjustment  will be insufficient  unless there are major changes in the 
relative  growth  rates  of demand  here and  abroad. 
Subsequent sections review the policy options for encouraging  ad- 
justment, starting  with a tariff.  In reviewing  the macroeconomic  effects 
of tariffs I highlight  the revenue effects and note that in general the 
effects on interest rates, prices, and exchange rates are dependent  on 
the monetary  rule. I explore  the effects under  a nominal  income  rule  and 
offer simulation  results to show the contractionary  effects of tariffs  on 
output.  After some discussion  of selective tariffs,  quotas, and  voluntary 
export restraints,  I conclude that further  dollar  depreciation  and com- 
petitive  interest  rate  reductions  are the preferable  policy choices. 
A Framework 
Figure 1 focuses on two key variables  in the U.S. economy, the full- 
employment  federal  budget  and  the real  exchange  rate.  For  concretcness 
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Figure 1.  Internal and External Balance 
Real  exchange  rate 
E  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I 
Fl  employment 
B  Current account  balance 
I 
0  Full-employment  budget deficit 
I assume that changes in the full-employment  budget take the form of 
increased  tax rates that  affect the economy by reducing  real spending  at 
each level of output.  The real exchange rate is measured  as the ratio of 
home to competitors'  prices in dollars,  PFeP*. For a given real interest 
rate, r, figure  1 shows the internal  and  external  balance  schedules. Along 
EE the noninterest  current  account  is in equilibrium:  a real  appreciation 
(a rise in PFeP*) brings  about a deficit and hence requires  higher  taxes 
and reduced spending  to maintain  external balance.1  Thus the area to 
the right  of EE represents  current  account  deficits. Along  II there is full 
employment:  a fiscal expansion raises real spending  and thus requires 
1. It is  assumed here that the noninterest current account (NICA) depends on 
disposable  income.  Hence changes  in the full-employment  budget  affect  both  the demand 
for domestic  goods and import  spending.  Letting  F denote the full-employment  budget, 
have  Y* =  A(Y,F,r,P/eP*)  +  NICA(Y,F,r,PleP*)  along II and NICA(Y,F,r,P/eP*)  =  0 
along  EE, where Y*  is full employment  output  and  A is total real spending  by domestic 
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the compensating  crowding  out brought  about by a real appreciation  to 
maintain  demand  at the full-employment  level. The area below the II 
schedule thus represents  a situation  of excess demand  or overemploy- 
ment. 
Today the United States is at a point like A, with the economy near 
full employment  and a large external deficit. My basic premise is that 
over the next decade the full-employment  budget  deficit  must be much 
reduced-for  graphical concreteness, to  zero. The resulting fall in 
disposable income will bring about some automatic  correction of the 
external deficit, but it will also reduce domestic demand. To restore 
internal  balance the expenditure-reducing  effect of budget balancing 
needs  to be supplemented  by expenditure-switching  policies such as real 
depreciation,  tariffs, or quotas. Thus the first point to be made is that 
budget cutting requires for full employment an accommodating  real 
exchange  rate  policy that  would  bring  the economy to a point such as B. 
As the figure  is drawn,  there  is current  account surplus  at B. But all that 
is essential is that  B represents  a lower current  account  deficit  than  A.2 
The importance  of the argument  that budget balancing  needs to be 
accompanied  by a move toward external balance is reinforced  by the 
political  dynamics  of budget  cutting.  It is unlikely  that  Congress  will cut 
the budget in economic conditions that would bring about an almost 
certain  recession. Hence there  is a need to pave the way for budget  cuts 
by strengthening  the external  balance  ahead  of time. Because adjustment 
lags are important,  a successful strategy involves depreciation  years 
ahead  of actual  budget  cutting. 
A second point focuses on external  debt dynamics, and in particular 
on the external debt-GNP ratio. To avoid overindebtedness, which 
would  bring  with it ultimate  but sudden  credit  rationing  and very costly 
adjustment  on short notice, much as is happening  to less developed 
countries now, the noninterest current account balance must swing 
toward  surplus.  With  a noninterest  surplus  the  debt-GNP  ratio  ultimately 
settles down when the surplus  is just sufficient  to service debt at a rate 
that  is determined  by the growth  rate-real  interest  rate  differential.  This 
kind  of argument  is familiar  from the literature  on LDC debts and has 
2. There  is also room  for  real  interest  rate  reductions  to achieve  this  objective.  Indeed, 
in well-functioning  markets  the long-term  real interest  rate would decline  in anticipation 
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Table 1.  The U.S.  External Balance and Net Investment Position,  1982-86 
Billions  of dollars unless  otherwise  indicated 
Item  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
International  investment  positiona  136.2  88.5  4.4  -107.4  -232.Ob 
Current  account  -9.1  -46.6  -  106.5  -  117.7  -  140.6 
Noninterest  current  accountc  - 37.8  - 71.4  -  125.3  -  142.9  -  163.5 
NICA as percent  of GNP  -  1.2  - 2.1  - 3.3  - 3.6  - 3.9 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  Survey  of  Curretit Business,  various 
issues. 
a.  U.S.  assets  abroad less  foreign assets  in the United  States  at the end of the year. 
b.  Preliminary. 
c.  The current account  less  net receipts  of investment  income  in the balance of payments  accounts. 
been used with foresight in discussions of the dollar exchange rate by 
Paul  Krugman.3 
The argument  can be formulated  in terms of the equations for full 
employment  and  the accumulation  of external  debt. Let b be the ratio  of 
net external  liabilities  to GNP, r the real interest  rate, and  y the growth 
rate of output. The ratio of net external liabilities (debt, for short) to 
GNP increases  as follows: 
(1)  b = (r -  y)b -  x, 
where  x is the ratio  of the noninterest  current  account  to GNP. 
Table 1 shows recent data for U.S.  net foreign assets and for the 
current  account  and  the noninterest  current  account. 
Net external  liabilities  are still small,  amounting  to about  6 percent  of 
GNP. But the noninterest  current  account adds currently  at a rate of 
nearly  4 percent of GNP a year to these deficits so that external  debt is 
rising  by about  this same  percentage  of GNP in 1986.4 
Figure  2 suggests  alternative  time paths of the real  exchange  rate and 
external  debt. The vertical  axis is the real exchange rate, as in figure 1. 
The ratio of external  debt to GNP is on the horizontal  axis. The figure 
3. Paul  R. Krugman,  "Is the Strong  Dollar  Sustainable?"  in Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas  City,  The  U.S.  Dollar:  Recent  Developments,  Outlook  and  Policy  Options 
(FRBKC,  1985),  pp. 103-32. 
4.  Note the peculiarity  in the relation  of net external  assets and investment  income. 
Even though  the United States in 1986  was already  a net debtor  the investment  income 
balance  was still  positive. In part  this  reflects  inadequacies  of the net investment  position, 
in part  the composition  of assets and  liabilities.  For example,  U.S. claims  on LDCs carry 
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Figure 2.  Alternative Adjustment Paths 
Real  exchange  rate 
l\/  Full employment 
0 
Unchanging  external debt-GNP  ratio  c 
External debt-GNP  ratio 
shows internal  balance  or full employment  (given  appropriately  varying 
combinations  of real  interest  rates  and  the  full-employment  budget)  along 
the II schedule. The effect of external debt on aggregate  demand is 
negative-that is, the curve slopes down-because  of the implied  reduc- 
tion in disposable  income.5  Along the 00  schedule the external debt- 
GNP  ratio  is constant.  It is rising  in the area  above 00.  The 00  schedule 
is drawn  for the case in which  the growth  rate  of income  exceeds the real 
interest rate so that a debtor nation can run a deficit on noninterest 
current  account  and still reduce  the ratio  of debt to GNP. 
5. The exact dynamics  of this effect would have to be studied  taking  account of the 
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From  an initial  point  of internal  balance  like  A the economy will have 
to move over time to B. If the real exchange rate is slow to move, the 
risk is that the real exchange  rate will have to overshoot ultimately  to a 
point like C in order to sustain full employment while reducing the 
external  debt relative to GNP. Too high an exchange rate in the early 
stages  of borrowing  thus  leads  to overindebtedness  that  ultimately  forces 
the economy for some time to points southeast  of B. 
The policy discussion of full employment  and the external balance 
involves two questions. First, do asset markets  look far enough ahead, 
or do they allow disequilibria  to build  up that  ultimately  are solved by a 
crash?  If asset markets  are not farsighted,  one cannot  be confident  that 
real exchange rates and long-term  interest rates anticipate  the ultimate 
correction in the budget and the noninterest current account. Real 
depreciation  is too sluggish,  and  long-term  interest  rates  remain  too high. 
Second, if asset markets are farsighted, is the adjustment  path they 
impose the best one, taking  into account macroeconomic  facts such as 
lack of full wage-price flexibility, potential real wage rigidities, and 
political constraints on the use of fiscal policy? In either case,  the 
external balance and long-term  real interest rates require  policy inter- 
vention. 
The Nonissue Arguments 
The need for active policy intervention has been challenged on a 
number  of grounds. The most obvious argument  is that the necessary 
correction in long-term  real interest rates and the external balance is 
already  under  way. With  rising  inflation  and expectations  of increasing 
inflation,  the long-term  real interest rate has in fact declined. The real 
depreciation  has already been significant, and all that is required is 
patience: the adjustment  in the external  balance is already  under  way. 
In this view the emphasis  now must  be on budget  correction  so as not to 
risk a crowding out of investment when strong trade improvements 
collide in a fully employed  economy with domestic  demand  that  remains 
overly strong.  Franco  Modigliani  has argued  along  these lines, especially 
in pointing  out that at full employment  the external  balance correction 
that  is under  way must  come at the expense of investment  unless budget 
cuts reduce  consumption.6 
6. See Franco  Modigliani,  "In the Shadow  of the Budget  Deficit," New York  Times, 
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Another  argument,  based primarily  on capital gains on U.S. stocks 
and  real estate over the past two years, suggests  that  there  is no need to 
generate a noninterest  current account surplus. Steady capital gains 
permit  a portion  of U.S. assets to be sold off steadily  without  risking  a 
decline in wealth and the standard  of living. But the question is why 
there  should  be a steady  real  asset appreciation  of a sufficient  magnitude 
to finance  the gap between spending  and income. One reason might  be 
the nature  of international  capital  markets.  One could argue  that many 
countries,  especially  Japan,  remain  largely  undiversified,  with too small 
a portion  of U.S. assets in their  portfolios.  Hence many  years of deficits 
can still be easily financed. 
Indeed, it is precisely  the opening  of capital  markets  and  the resulting 
improvement in the market value of  U.S.  assets  that justifies the 
overspending.  Just as a terms-of-trade  improvement  would  justify in- 
creased spending,  so do the capital  gains  from  a favorable  shift  in world 
demand  for a country's assets. The difficulty  with this argument  is that 
it amounts  to a sizable  gamble.  If portfolio  holders  one day  do get satiated 
with U.S. assets, or simply want to slow down the rate of addition  to 
their  portfolios,  there  will have to be a much  larger  correction  in the real 
exchange  rate. The reason  is that  the lack of competitiveness  over a long 
period  of time will have led to disinvestment  and  hence a lack of capital, 
skills, and  organization  in all  forms  that  would  make  it possible  to resume 
net exports at short notice. If central bank intervention  rather than 
private  saving  has already  been financing  a major  part  of the U.S. trade 
deficit,  skepticism  about  the ability  to finance  extended  deficits  becomes 
even more  pressing. 
Some people recognize  that  the current  budget  and  external  positions 
are unsustainable  but argue  that correction  is not required  because, at 
some  point,  a shift  to sharply  inflationary  policies will  liquidate  the debts. 
The budget  constraint  need not hold, and  hence it would  be a mistake  to 
live by it. This argument  is offered particularly  to mark  the difference 
between dollar debts of LDCs that those debtors cannot inflate away 
and the special opportunity  of the United States. But the argument 
encounters  the difficulty  that  the necessary inflation  policy may be very 
expensive. A collapse of the dollar would certainly be inevitable and 
that  collapse, while reducing  the burden  of debts, would  also worsen the 
terms of trade. The extra inflation  would be so costly that it looks like 
an implausible  policy design. A more credible scenario relies on a 
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reduction  would mean that debt problems  disappear  provided  there is 
moderate  growth and that noninterest  current  account deficits can be 
trimmed  to moderate  levels. 
Another  view acknowledges  the ultimate  need for adjustment  in the 
external  balance,  but  argues  that  the adjustment  will come automatically 
when budget correction takes place. The increase in taxes will cut 
domestic demand.  The reduction  in spending  will free goods for export 
and reduce import  spending.  The direction  of these effects is certainly 
correct. But two questions remain.  One is whether the spending  cut is 
sufficient  to restore external  balance, including  debt service. The other 
concerns full employment.  If spending  is cut without  adjustment  in the 
real  exchange  rate  there  is bound  to be unemployment.  What  is needed, 
as I have already  explained,  is both expenditure-reducing  and expendi- 
ture-switching  policies. Budget cutting  by itself cannot satisfy the twin 
objectives of full employment  and external  balance. Real interest  rates 
and the real exchange rate will have to adjust to accommodate the 
increase  in national  saving  at full employment. 
A final argument  against  active policy is that the market  will, when 
the time  comes, make  all  adjustments  required  to assure  full  employment. 
Herbert  Stein has made  this argument: 
Does anyone  know  an optimum  rate  of the trade  deficit  other  than  what  emerges 
in the market?  I think  not. Certainly  the optimum  rate is not zero. A cliche of 
these days is that  a trade  deficit  of the present  size cannot  go on forever.  This is 
not axiomatically  true,  but it is probably  true.  That  does not, however, give any 
guidance. .  . if something  cannot  go on forever  it will stop. Government  action 
to stop it is not required.7 
The argument  is impeccable if one believes that markets always get 
things  right.  The question  remains  whether  asset markets  do get it right 
and whether  they have done so in this instance. This is the point made 
by Stanley  Fischer.8 
A Forecast for Net Exports 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop persuasive counter- 
arguments  and demonstrations  for each of these positions, which, in 
7. Quoted  from  Herbert  Stein, "Leave the Trade  Deficit  Alone," Wall  Street  Journal, 
March 11, 1987. See also Stein, "Thoughts  on Exchange Rates and All That," AEI 
Economist  (November  1986),  and  "A Primer  on the  Other  Deficit,"  AEI  Economist  (March 
1987). 
8. See Stanley  Fischer, Comments  on "Symposium  on Exchange  Rates, Trade,  and 
Capital  Flows," BPEA,  1:1986,  pp. 227-32. Rudiger Dornbusch  257 
combination,  suggest that the trade problem may not be as bad as it 
appears.  A rebuttal  would  include  the list of arguments  that suggests  the 
need for early and large  adjustment  in the noninterest  current  account. 
The most important  of these is the risk that asset markets are not 
farsighted  and  that  as a result  the United  States  is disinvesting  in  precisely 
those industries  whose existence would ease adjustment  and  reduce  the 
ultimate  need for a significant  overshooting  of exchange  rates. 
Instead of making  a detailed rebuttal,  I will investigate  whether the 
current  level of the dollar  is in some fundamental  way appropriate.  This 
requires identifying  the main determinants  of net exports and asking 
whether a major  improvement  in net exports can be expected at the 
current level of the dollar, taking into account lags. In a regression 
reported  below, the determinants  of U.S. net exports are the real ex- 
change rate, relative levels of real total spending  in the United States 
and  other  industrialized  countries,  and  a time trend.  The  following  were 
the results, using quarterly data from 1975 through 1986 and with 
t-statistics  in parentheses:9 
NET  =  90.0  -  5.961og(PIeP*) 
(2)  (7.86)  (-3.78) 
-  12.231og(D/D*)  -  0.04 Time, 
(-  3.68)  (-6.18) 
R2 = 0.96;  rho = 0.43; standard  error  = 0.28, 
where  NET is nominal  U.S. net exports  in the national  income accounts 
as a percent of GNP, PleP* is a distributed  lag of the relative value- 
added  deflator  in manufacturing,  and  DID*  is relative  levels of real  total 
spending. 
The regression  shows that real exchange  rates and relative spending 
levels are significant  determinants  of net exports. A  16 percent real 
depreciation  increases net exports by 1 percent of GNP, as does an 8 
percent rise in the relative level of foreign real spending. There is an 
adverse  time trend  in net exports that leads over a six-year  period to a 
deterioration  in net exports  by 1 percent. 
9. The  real  exchange  rate  measure  is the  International  Monetary  Fund's  relative  value- 
added deflator in manufacturing reported in International Financial  Statistics.  The index 
of the relative  levels of real gross domestic spending  was calculated  as follows: for the 
United  States,  real  gross domestic  spending;  for the rest of the world,  a weighted  average 
index  for  the non-U.  S. OECD  constructed  from  interpolated  annual  data.  The weights  are 
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Figure 3.  U.S.  Net Exports,  1982:1-1986:4,  and Forecasts under Alternative Foreign 
Growth Rates,  1987:1-1992:4a 








\  A  X  ~~~~~~~~Constant  freign  growth 
-  1.5 
- 2.0 
- 2.5 
-3.0  a  *  * *  *  I  .  .  .  I  .  .  .  .  .j 
1983:1  1985:1  1987:1  1989:1  1991:1 
Sources:  Actual data are from Survey of Cuirretnt  Busitness, vol.  66 (July 1986), and vol.  67 (April  1987). Forecast 
is based on equation  2 in the text. 
a.  Quarterly  data.  The  forecast  is  for  two  alternative  scenarios.  In both  cases,  the  real exchange  rate is  held 
constant  at the level of  1987:1. The faster foreign growth case  assumes  a 2.5 percent differential growth rate of  U.S. 
and foreign real spending for a three-year period. The constant  foreign growth case  assumes  constant  relative levels 
of real spending. 
Figure 3 uses a forecast from this regression under two alternative 
scenarios. In one case the real exchange rate is held at the level of the 
first quarter  of 1987  and relative levels of spending  are held constant. 
This scenario highlights  that a significant  improvement  in net exports 
stemming  from  the lagged  effects of dollar  depreciation  is to be expected. 
But  the forecast  also shows that  net exports  remain  in deficit  and  that  by Rudiger Dornbusch  259 
the early 1990s  that deficit  comes to exceed 1 percent  of GNP. In terms 
of debt dynamics this scenario is not consistent with a convergence 
toward  a stationary  ratio  of external  liabilities  to GNP. 
Equation  2 suggests  that the current  level of the dollar  is appropriate 
only if there is to be a substantial  shift in relative spending  levels. The 
"faster  foreign  growth"  scenario  shown  in figure  3 assumes  a 2.5 percent 
differential  in the growth  rate of real spending  for a three-year  period. 
This cumulative  growth  differential  is enough  to bring  the U.S. external 
balance  near zero at least for a while. But since there is little prospect 
that  Europe  and  Japan  will double  their  growth  rates  of demand  over the 
next three years, the growth  differential  would have to come primarily 
from slower U.S.  growth. While that would help solve the external 
balance problem, it does not deal with the unemployment  issue. Ex- 
change  rate or commercial  policy must help bring  about  a correction  of 
the external  balance. The balance of the paper assesses the trade-offs 
involved  in using  alternative  instruments  to accomplish  this objective. 
The Impact of a Uniform Tariff 
First I consider  the impact  of a tariff  that is levied at a uniform  rate, 
say 10 percent, on all merchandise  imports. It is helpful to start the 
analysis in a classical setting with full wage-price flexibility and full 
employment.  I later  add short-term  macroeconomic  detail. 
A  CLASSICAL  SETTING 
The determination  of the real exchange  rate  or the terms  of trade  and 
the real interest rate under conditions of perfect competition  and full 
wage-price  flexibility  are at the center of the classical model. 
A tariff  introduces  a wedge between  the relative  prices  faced by home 
residents  and  the rest of the world. A crucial  assumption  in the analysis 
of tariffs  is the use of the proceeds. I assume that the government  uses 
the proceeds to correct  the budget  deficit. Consequently  an increase in 
the  tariff  will  have an  income  effect equal  to the increase  in tariff  revenue. 
At a given  world  price  ratio  the imposition  of a tariff  raises the domestic 
relative  price of imports  and creates an excess supply  of foreign  goods 
since  both  income  and  substitution  effects lead  to a reduction  in demand. 
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and substitution  effects work in opposite directions. If these effects 
exactly cancel, it is readily shown that equilibrium  interest rates must 
fall and  the world  relative  price of domestic  goods must  rise. 
The classical model  thus shows the role of the relative  size of income 
and  substitution  effects. Since the tariff  revenues  are used to reduce  the 
budget  deficit,  the tariff  represents  a combination  of expenditure-reduc- 
ing and expenditure-switching  policies. Strong income effects tend to 
leave relative  world  prices unchanged  and lead to a large  decline in the 
world real interest rate. By contrast, strong substitution  effects bring 
about  a larger  real dollar  appreciation  and relatively  less of a decline in 
the real interest  rate. Uncertainty  about  the relative size of income and 
substitution  effects carries  over to a short-term  macroeconomic  setting. 
The real appreciation  or terms-of-trade  improvement  that occurs 
when substitution  effects dominate  is the way in which the rest of the 
world is made to pay part  of the tariff.  The idea of an optimum  tariff  is 
based on exactly this fact. A large country will benefit by adopting  a 
tariff so as to improve the terms of trade. At the optimum  tariff the 
welfare cost of misallocating  resources exactly offsets the gains from 
the transfer  of resources  implicit  in the terms-of-trade  improvement. 
A  MACROECONOMIC  SETTING 
The macroeconomic  setting  is distinguished  from  the classical model 
by the assumption  of at least potential  wage-price  stickiness and sticki- 
ness of the real  wage. There  is a possibility  of transitory  unemployment, 
and  there  is room  for strategic  considerations  in price setting. Likewise, 
wage setting  need not be geared  exclusively to full employment.  10  With 
real  wage  stickiness  there  is even a possibility  of long-run  unemployment. 
The effects of a tariff on output, prices, the trade balance, interest 
rates, and  the exchange  rate  are  of particular  interest.  A tariff  might  lead 
to an undesirable  combination  of changes, including  a decline  in output, 
higher  interest  rates, higher  prices, and  an appreciation  of the currency. 
Unfortunately  the effects of a tariff  are not predictable  in general  terms 
because monetary policy here and abroad, foreign fiscal policy, and 
10. See Edward  Tower, "Commercial  Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange 
Rates,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol.  87 (August  1983), pp. 436-54,  for an early 
macroeconomic  discussion.  See also Robert  A. Mundell,  International  Economics  (Mac- 
millan,  1968). Rudiger Dornbusch  261 
wage- and price-setting  behavior influence the results decisively and 
thus  leave open a wide range  of outcomes. The effect of a tariff  depends 
also on details  of money demand  and aggregate  demand  on which there 
is little  or no empirical  information. 
To make headway I assume that monetary  policy follows a rule of 
stabilizing  nominal  income: 
(3)  p  +y  = c, 
where  p and  y denote the logarithms  of producer  prices and output  and 
c is the policy-determined  constant  level of nominal  income. The goods 
market  equilibrium  is shown in equation  4 and price dynamics  in equa- 
tion 5: 
(4)  y = d(e + T-p)  g(i*  +  e), 
(5)  =  v(y  -  y') 
where y'  denotes full-employment  output. Substituting  the nominal 
income  rule  in equations  4 and  5 yields equations  for the rate  of inflation 
and  the rate  of depreciation,  given the world  interest  rate  i*. For the case 
where substitution  effects dominate, it can be shown that a tariff will 
lead to an immediate  appreciation  of the exchange rate, an unchanged 
level of real  interest  rates, and no effect on output. 
The exchange  rate  appreciation  only partially  offsets the effect of the 
tariff  on relative  prices, but the offset is more complete the smaller  the 
income  effect of the tariff.  Demand  can be sustained  at the full-employ- 
ment level  by an exchange rate appreciation that crowds out the 
expenditure-switching  effect of the tariff. Of course, in a model of the 
world  economy this assessment of the effects cannot  be complete since 
there  is a change  in world  saving. 
To consider an extension in which a tariff has long-run  effects on 
output,  I explore  the case where  the consumption  wage  is rigid.  11  If firms 
use markup  pricing  and if wages rise when the cost of living increases, 
we get a model of inflation  different  from equation  5, in which inflation 
will depend on the relation between the consumer price level and 
producer  prices: 
11. The case of protection with fixed real wages has been explored by S.  van 
Wijnbergen,  "Tariffs,  Employment  and  the Current  Account:  On  the Macroeconomics  of 
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(5a)  P =  u(q -  p);  q =  (1 -  a)p  +  a(e  +  T), 
where q is the consumer  price level. Now a tariff  will have effects on 
exchange rates and prices. There will be an impact  on long-run  output 
because of real  wage rigidity.  12 
In this new setting the tariff  works through  two separate  channels. 
On the demand  side there are the income and substitution  effects. But 
now, in addition,  there is a constraint  on the consumption  wage, which 
is fixed. When  the tariff  reduces  the consumption  wage, at a given world 
relative  price, there needs to be an offsetting  gain in the terms of trade 
to restore cost-price  balance. This latter effect constrains  the long-run 
equilibrium  of the model  and  leads to a reduction  in long-run  equilibrium 
output and employment. The mechanism is the following. The tariff 
leads immediately  to some appreciation.  With  dominant  income effects 
the appreciation  brings  about  excess demand  and  an initial  rise in output. 
But from the cost side there is now inflation  because the appreciation 
will not have been sufficient to compensate for the reduction of the 
consumption  wage due to the tariff. Over time wages and home prices 
are  rising.  The exchange  rate  further  appreciates  until  a new equilibrium 
is reached in which the consumption  wage has returned  to the initial 
level, with higher  prices and an appreciation  of the exchange rate. The 
tariff  is fully paid by the rest of the world, but output  and employment 
have declined. 
A nominal  income  rule  for  monetary  policy rules  out important  money 
market effects.  Output effects therefore stem only from real wage 
rigidities  and are absent if relative  prices can change  without  effects on 
labor  supply. But if the money supply  is not sufficiently  accommodating 
there is a possibility that price increases induced by the tariff raise 
interest rates and lead to real appreciation  beyond what is required  to 
offset the tariff.  Then output  may actually  decline. A Data Resources, 
Inc., simulation  makes  the point. 
DRI  MODEL  SIMULATION  RESULTS 
The DRI model  was simulated  in 1985  for the case of a temporary  and 
declining  import  surcharge.  The tariff  starts at 20 percent and declines 
12.  The equations  are,  respectively,  p  =  va (e  +  T -  p) and e  =  (lIg)[p(l  -  d) 
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Table  2. Simulation  of a Temporary  Import  Surchargea 
Difference  from baseline  projections 
Year 
Item  1  2  3  4 
Federal  surplus  (billions  of dollars)  71  50  15  -  14 
Current  account (billions  of dollars)  50  59  26  -3 
Real GNP (percent)  -0.2  -0.8  -  1.1  -0.8 
Treasury  bill rate (basis points)  15  40  35  -15 
Money supply  (MI, percent)  0.9  0.5  -0.2  -0.5 
Consumer  price index (percent)  0.8  0.8  0.4  0.0 
Real exchange  rate appreciation  (percent)  1.6  3.9  2.1  -  1.4 
Export  volume (percent)  - 0.2  -  1.7  - 2.6  -  1.3 
Source:  Christopher  Caton,  "The Effects  of a Temporary  Import  Tariff,"  in Data  Resources,  Inc., Review  of the 
U.S. Economy  (DRI, March  1985),  table  3. 
a. Simulation  of a uniform  tariff  on all imports  including  oil, assuming  no foreign  retaliation  and  one-half  absorption 
of the tariff  by foreign  suppliers.  The tariff  is 20 percent  the first  year, 15 percent  the second, 7 percent  the third, 
and  zero the fourth. 
over the following  three years to 15  percent, 7 percent, then zero. The 
simulation assumes explicitly no foreign retaliation and a one-half 
absorption  of the tariff  by foreign suppliers.  The tariff  is uniform  and 
without  exemption  on all imports,  including  oil. The policy assumption 
is that there is modest monetary accommodation,  not exceeding a 1 
percent  deviation  from the baseline case. The difference  from baseline 
projections  is shown in table  2. 
In the early stage of the tariff  there  is an increase  in interest  rates and 
a currency appreciation. Real GNP declines because the fiscal and 
interest  rate effects dominate  the substitution  effects. The appreciation 
implies  that the gain in competitiveness  in the final year of the tariff  is 
quite  minor  and that, accordingly,  output  declines throughout  the tariff 
episode. An important  aspect of the tariff is that it reduces exports 
because  the real  exchange  rate  appreciates. 
The simulation  highlights  one essential feature of the tariff, namely, 
the persistent  favorable  effect on the budget. Because the proceeds of 
the tariff  reduce the budget  deficit, they slow down debt accumulation 
and  hence reduce  the long-run  deficit  relative  to the baseline  simulation. 
This revenue feature has led William  Branson to advocate tariffs as a 
means  to improve  the external  balance  and the budget.13 
13. William  H. Branson,  Comments  on "Macroeconomics  and  Protection,"  in Robert 
M. Stern, ed.,  U.S.  Trade Policies  in a Changing Economy  (MIT Press,  1987), pp.  131- 
36; and Branson  and James Pearce, "The Case for an Import  Surcharge"  (Princeton 
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Tariffs versus Depreciation 
Both the theoretical  analysis  of the tariff  under  a nominal  income rule 
and the simulation  results emphasize that a tariff brings together ex- 
penditure-reducing  and expenditure-switching  features. It thus can 
improve  the budget  and the current  account at the same time. But there 
are costs when monetary  policy is not fully accommodating  and when 
real  wages are sticky. How do the costs and  benefits  of a tariff  compare 
with those of depreciation? 
Both a tariff and depreciation  raise the relative price of imports at 
home, but depreciation  offers no beneficial  fiscal  effect. Where  the tariff 
yields revenue, the depreciation  leads to a terms-of-trade  deterioration. 
Later I will look at a depreciation  combined  with an increase in taxes. 
Now I consider  depreciation  alone, brought  about  by an increase  in the 
nominal  income target. In terms of equations  3 through  5 there is now 
an increase  in c to c'. Figure  4 shows the effects. The vertical  axis is the 
exchange rate expressed as the unit of domestic currency  per unit of 
foreign  currency.  Thefp  = 0 schedule  shows the price  level at which, for 
a given nominal  income target,  output  is at the full-employment  level so 
that  there  are  no inflationary  pressures.  To the right,  prices are too high, 
and hence output  too low, so that there is deflation.  To the left, there is 
inflation.  Along  e  = 0 (drawn  for the case where  d < 1)  home and  foreign 
interest  rates are equal,  given the nominal  income target.  An increase  in 
prices lowers output  (given the target)  relative  to demand.  To eliminate 
the excess demand  for domestic goods the exchange rate must appreci- 
ate, thus diverting  demand to imports and reducing  net exports. The 
initial  full-employment  equilibrium  is at point  A. 
An  expansion  in  the  nominal  income  target  moves theb and  e schedules 
to p' and  e'  as shown in figure  4. The new long-run  equilibrium  is at A', 
where we have an equiproportionate  increase in the exchange  rate and 
prices. But in the short run, before prices change, the economy moves 
to point  B on the stable  trajectory  KK. The exchange  rate, as is common 
in models of short-run  price stickiness, will overshoot. At B there is an 
expansion of output and employment  beyond full employment  and an 
improvement  in the external  balance. Inflation  sets in and the advance 
in real output  is gradually  eroded. The nominal  interest  rate, which at B 
had  declined, now starts  rising  back to the world  level. The low (though Rudiger Dornbusch  265 
Figure 4.  The Shift to a Higher Nominal Income Target 
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rising)  level of the home interest  rate  is offset by gradual  appreciation  as 
the  economy  moves  fromB  toA'. Thus  in  this  long-run  classical  economy 
depreciation  has only transitory  benefits. It does lead to a transitory 
improvement  in the external  balance and to a gain in output;  but these 
gains  are not sustained  because the increase  in inflation  collides with the 
nominal  income target and leads to a gradual  erosion of the gains in 
competitiveness  and  net exports. 
Consider  next the case where  the depreciation  policy is supplemented 
with  an increase  in taxes. Now there  will be a long-run  real  depreciation 
to ensure  that  the reduction  in domestic  demand  stemming  from  reduced 
disposable income is offset by the crowding in of net exports. The 
adjustment  path  is as shown  in figure  4 except that  the exchange  rate  will 
depreciate  even further  in the short run. In the long run the economy 
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It is worth  repeating  that  a depreciation  would  not have the beneficial 
fiscal  effects of a tariff.  With  a depreciation  the terms  of trade  deteriorate 
and  thus transfer  real  income abroad  rather  than  to the budget. Only  for 
the private  sector is the income effect the same as in the case of a tariff. 
Despite the absence of the beneficial  fiscal effect, depreciation  offers 
several  advantages  over a tariff.  The first  is that  depreciation  represents 
an export subsidy  while a tariff  amounts  to an export tax by way of the 
induced currency appreciation.  The import sector will benefit under 
each policy,  but the consequences for the export sector are quite 
different.  Under  a tariff  the export sector is taxed through  the apprecia- 
tion of the exchange rate. By contrast a depreciation  is a subsidy for 
exports. Depreciation  reduces imports  and  raises exports, while a tariff 
reduces  both, though  with a larger  impact  on imports. 
Another  disadvantage  of a tariff  is that  it is bound  to invite retaliation 
or  emulation,  especially  if it is permanent.  Joan  Robinson  has  commented 
on the choice between depreciation  and the tariff  as alternative  beggar- 
my-neighbor  policies: 
All expedients  are subject  to the objection  that they are calculated  to promote 
retaliation;  indeed  this  is the  very  nature  of the  beggar-my-neighbor  game.  Which 
expedient  is the least dangerous  from  this  point  of view will depend  upon  general 
political  considerations.  14 
Depreciation, unlike tariffs, is unlikely to lead to emulation. But if it 
does, that  is strictly  for the better. A depreciation  would  under  the most 
favorable conditions degenerate  into competitive interest rate cuts as 
each country seeks to maintain  and improve its competitiveness by 
trying  to push  capital  out. At the present  juncture  of the world  economy, 
that would be a very favorable  outcome. Needless to say, competitive 
interest  rate cutting  would make a major,  direct contribution  to budget 
balancing. 15 
The third  disadvantage  of a tariff  is that  if it is permanent, it represents 
an inefficient  means  of achieving  a long-term  improvement  in the budget 
and the external  balance. The resource  costs of balancing  the budget  in 
this way, not even counting  the risk of retaliation,  are significant,  and 
14.  See Joan Robinson,  Essays  in the Theory of Employment (Macmillan,  1937), pp. 
227-28. 
15. It is, of course, possible that  foreign  countries  respond  to a U.S. tariff  by cutting 
their  interest  rates. But  this seems a less characteristic  response  than  a tariff  war. Rudiger Dornbusch  267 
the same objectives can be attained  in a more cost-effective way by a 
depreciation  and  increases  in general  taxation.  Of course, that  judgment 
has to stop short of being categorical  because budget balancing  in the 
absence of a tariff  is unlikely to be done with neutral  lump-sum  taxes. 
Increased  income taxes are also distortionary,  and  it is conceivable  that 
there are much worse budget-balancing  packages than a permanent 
tariff. Even so,  the balance of arguments favors depreciation both 
because of the potentially  favorable  short-term  macroeconomic  effects 
and because broad taxes are more efficient than equal-revenue  trade 
taxes. 
Uniform Tariffs versus Selective Policies 
An alternative to a uniform tariff is  a selective system of trade 
intervention  such as a tariff  on manufactures  only, a tariff  on Japanese 
goods only, a voluntary export restraint  exercised by countries with 
bilateral  surpluses, or the auctioning  of quotas. Each of these policies 
will have macroeconomic  effects. Like a tariff they will tend to raise 
import  prices and  will shift  demand  toward  domestic  goods. In the same 
way as a tariff  they will have an income  effect that  may or may not favor 
the budget, but certainly  reduces aggregate  demand. The direction of 
macroeconomic  effects is thus the same as it would be in the case of a 
tariff,  but the selectivity and particulars  of the intervention  add to the 
complications. 
For example, an auctioning  of quotas captures the revenue for the 
government  in the same  way as a tariff  would. But the price  effects differ 
and  so do the current  account  effects. If, for example, the quota  applies 
to the  number  of automobiles,  one would  expect an  upgrading  of imported 
automobiles  with a resulting  effect on price. Japanese  or European  cars 
might  come ahead at the expense of Korean cars, and the result could 
be a net increase  in import  spending.  The price effects of a quota  would 
depend on the particular  market structure.  It is certainly conceivable 
that a quota could be much more inflationary  than an equal-revenue 
tariff. 
A voluntary  export restraint  differs from the quota auction in that 
foreign firms can raise their prices and collect the rents rather than 
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budget  and need not even improve  the trade  balance. They are presum- 
ably the worst kind  of protection  from  a macroeconomic  perspective. 
Geographic discrimination  in protection is  another direction for 
selectivity. The obvious criterion  would be to place a tariff on those 
countries that have a bilateral surplus with the United States. The 
difficulty  is that most problem  debtor  countries, including  Brazil, have 
trade surpluses with the United States. Imposition of a tariff would 
almost certainly  lead to a suspension  of interest  payments  and hence to 
a deterioration  in the current  account. Asian newly industrialized  coun- 
tries have a limited  ability  to absorb  trade  deterioration  before they too 
become problem  debtors, and Europe  would certainly  retaliate  against 
protective tariffs. That leaves Japan.  A tariff  on Japan  would improve 
U.S.  terms of trade and redistribute  income from Japan to the U.S. 
budget.  But would extra  imports  from Europe  and Korea  fill  the gap left 
by a tariff  on Japan?  If the substitutability  were high, the benefits  might 
turn  out to be too small  to warrant  such a massive confrontation. 
It is unlikely  that selective tariffs  targeted  on countries  or on groups 
of goods can efficiently  cope with the external  balance  and  employment 
problems.  But  in  the  context  of a  policy  package  of exchange  depreciation 
there  may be room  for such special revenue  tariffs  as an import  duty on 
oil. 
Concluding Remarks 
Depreciation,  tariffs, and quotas differ significantly  in their macro- 
economic effects,  particularly  in their impact on inflation, in their 
contribution  to budget  balancing,  and in their sectoral impacts. Tariffs 
are effective in balancing  budgets and may be less inflationary  than 
depreciation.  But they carry  the disadvantage  of inefficiency  in resource 
allocation,  particularly  when they are  permanent,  and-in  all likelihood 
the strongest  macroeconomic  argument  against  their  use-they  present 
an open invitation  for emulation  and  retaliation. 
By contrast  a policy of cutting  interest  rates to bring  about deprecia- 
tion, while raising taxes at the same time, may be the most effective 
means  to trigger  overdue  foreign  growth  policies. If world  interest  rates 
could  be cut, there  would  be much  less need for large  dollar  depreciation 
to solve the budget  and the external  balance  problem.  But interest  rates Rudiger Dornbusch  269 
will not be cut abroad  unless clean beggar-my-neighbor  depreciation 
forces Europe  and  Japan  to respond  in kind. 
It is often argued  that a policy of depreciation  could turn out to be 
self-defeating.  Loss of confidence  in Europe  and Japan  would lead to a 
fall  in investment,  adding  to the depressing  effects of lower exports. The 
cumulative  decline in income abroad, especially given accelerator  ef- 
fects, might  be so large  that  in the end U.S. exports  would  be lower, not 
higher.  Not only would the United States wreck foreign  economies by 
aggressive  depreciation,  it would hurt even its own interests. Hostage 
to the accelerator,  the United States would be best advised to halt any 
beggar-my-neighbor  policies until  foreign  economies acquire  more  vigor 
to withstand  the necessary adjustments  in the world economy. If the 
situation  is in  fact all that  precarious,  the case for fiscal  expansion  abroad 
and  for lower interest  rates  becomes even stronger. 